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Abstract 
The rapid introduction of Distributed Energy 
Resources (DER) into the retail/distribution 
sector of the electric power system has raised 
questions concerning both the economics and 
control of the power system.  This paper presents 
one market paradigm that builds upon extension 
of the logic of Locational Marginal Pricing into 
the distribution level arguing that this extension is 
necessary if there are to be competitive forces that 
bring new technologies to market while at the 
same time assuring the reliability of service. We 
introduce three concepts: first that there are only 
three core products (real power, reactive power 
and reserves) and that all other products are 
combinations of these; second that it is necessary 
to calculate Distributed Locational Marginal 
Prices (DLMP) in order to value any DER; and 
third that for there to be a market for DER it 
should be structured as an economic platform. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Widespread incorporation of Distributed 
Energy Resources (DER) arguably poses the most 
significant challenge to the electric utility industry 
since the advent of wholesale market restructuring 
that began in the 1990’s.  DER such as distributed 
generation, distributed storage and responsive 
demand, made possible because of advances in 
information and communication technology, have 
the potential to dramatically change the direction 
of the flow of kWh on the physical assets 
(substations, wires, etc.) of incumbent distribution 
utilities.  This change in energy flow will initially 
increase rates and ultimately would prevent those 
incumbents from collecting sufficient revenue to 
cover their fixed costs if policy makers do not 
approve changes in the basic structure of 
distribution tariffs to reflect the critical value of 
the distribution assets (connectivity) in providing 
reliability in supply of energy.   
 
While the concern for the possible negative 
revenue impacts of DER has gained the greatest 
attention, the states of New York and California 
have approached DER as a positive and 
economically efficient force in the delivery of 
electricity to consumers. ERCOT has developed 
an innovative pricing structure and much of 
Europe is struggling with the impact of DER and 
more generally the advent of massive infusion of 
renewable technologies into the power system.  
Australia is in the midst of evaluating 
economically efficient means of incorporating 
DER into their energy-only market. 
 
New York and California have proceeded 
quite differently in their approach to adoption of a 
pro DER position. New York has created a 
proceeding within the state entitled Reforming the 
Energy Vision (REV) with a focus on creating 
one or more markets for the products of DER. 
California has focused more on legislative and 
administrative mandates in an effort to require the 
distribution utilities to incorporate  greater 
quantities of DER in their  distribution systems. 
The objective of this paper is to present one 
market paradigm that builds upon the logic of 
Locational Marginal Pricing (LMP) suggesting 
that extending the logic of marginal cost pricing / 
valuing into the distribution sector is not only 
feasible but necessary if there are to be 
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competitive forces that bring new DER 
technologies to market while at the same time 
assuring the reliability of service. [1] 
We introduce three critical concepts in 
development of a competitive market at the retail 
level and relate these to both the wholesale market 
experience and to the underlying physics of the 
power system.  The first concept is that there are 
three core products (real power, reactive power 
and reserves); all other products in the market are 
combinations of these three in function, space and 
time.  The second concept is that it is both 
necessary and possible to calculate Distributed 
Locational Marginal Costs (DLMPs) and that 
without this ability it is not possible to accurately 
value any given DER.  The third concept is that 
for there to be a market for DER that can be 
interactive with the wholesale market there should 
be an economic platform on which the DER 
products can be traded.  These three concepts are 
developed within the paper and numeric examples 
are provided of the economic value of “getting the 
prices right” at the distribution level. 
2. Regulatory Initiatives: Overview 
The New York Public Service Commission 
initiated the Reforming the Energy Vision (REV) 
proceeding in April 2014.  The February 26, 2015 
Order in the REV proceeding states that the 
general goal of REV is to move the electric 
industry and ratemaking paradigm toward a 
“…consumer-centered approach that harnesses 
technology and markets.”[2] The Feb. 26 Order 
introduces the concept of a Distributed System 
Platform (DSP) provider, an entity responsible for 
three major functions at the distribution level: 
integrated system planning, grid operations, and 
market operations.  The Order assigns the role of 
DSP to the state’s distribution utilities.   The 
Framework Order places particular emphasis on 
improving and increasing the integration of 
distributed energy resources (DER) into the 
planning and operation of the state’s electric 
distribution systems.  It expects that better 
integration will lead to “…optimal system 
efficiencies, secure universal, affordable service, 
and enable the development of a resilient, climate-
friendly energy system.”   
Juxtaposed against the platform-based 
proposed market structure for New York is a more 
centrally driven structure in California.  The 
California approach focuses on requiring 
aggregators to acquire and package DER products 
(e.g., real energy, reactive power, capacity) and to 
offer those products in the CAISO markets. [3] 
The focus in California continues to be on the 
increased penetration of specific DER such as 
solar and storage.  
 
3. The Core Products  
This paper distinguishes three categories of core 
electric products that are central to the operation 
of power systems: real energy, reactive power, 
and reserves.   
 Real energy, measured in kWh, is the 
fundamental physical electric commodity 
underlying the electric products required by 
utilities, ESCOs and customers. This fact is 
particularly relevant to the formation of prices 
for the other core electric products. 
 Reactive power or VAR (Volt Ampere 
Reactive), measured in kVAR, sustains the 
electrical field in alternating-current systems 
while maintaining voltage within specific 
limits required by regulation,   
 Reserves, measured in KW, represent the 
potential to deliver real energy (kWh) at a 
point in the future.   
The other electric products discussed are all 
derivatives of, or combinations of, these three 
core products. 
Reactive power and reserves are critical to the 
reliable operation of distribution systems. Utilities 
maintain voltage within specified limits and have 
traditionally done so through the design of 
distribution circuits and investments in capacitors.  
Reactive power from DER represents a 
supplemental if not alternative source.  Significant 
PV penetration can lead to violations of voltage 
standards that protect customer equipment and 
cause capacitors to exceed their design daily duty 
cycles and quickly “wear out,” suggesting that 
services for voltage control will become 
increasingly valuable at locations where utilities 
are integrating greater quantities of PV.  
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Operating reserves from DER that can ramp their 
output up and down quickly may be particularly 
valuable at specific locations on distribution 
systems where the Distribution Utility would 
otherwise have to make a traditional infrastructure 
investment. DER are widely recognize to have the 
potential to provide core electric products that can 
serve as alternatives to capital investments in 
distribution system infrastructure and/or to 
procurement of electric products from wholesale 
markets. [4] PV can provide real energy and 
reactive power, EV and Electric Energy Storage 
can provide all three core products and DR can 
provide real energy and reserves.  
One of the economic factors that will affect 
the quantity of each core product a specific DER 
will choose to provide during any given time 
interval is the fact that any unit (kW, for instance) 
of a specific resource can provide only one of the 
three products during that time interval, i.e., either 
real energy, or reactive power or reserves. [5] As 
a result, the party controlling operation of a DER 
must choose which product to provide during a 
given time interval. The prices of those products 
not chosen represent the party’s “opportunity 
cost” of not being able to use its DER to provide 
those products during that time interval. Since real 
energy is the dominant core product the prices for 
reactive power and for reserves tend to be heavily 
affected by the opportunity cost of not producing 
real energy.  
 
The contractual and operational attributes of 
these core products will also affect their value 
including: 
 Product Location. Where the product may be 
bought or sold and for which product prices 
are set. It identifies the geographic granularity 
of the product market. Locations may be 
region-, zone- or utility-wide; at an 
aggregated pricing node or trading hub; or at 
a location as specific as the meter for a 
customer or resource. 
 Product Period: The time period for which 
the product may be transacted and prices are 
determined. It identifies the time granularity 
of the product market. For energy products, 
this might be a five-minute interval. However, 
forward capacity products can be traded on a 
monthly, seasonal, or annual basis. 
 Financially Binding Forward Commitment 
and Associated Financial Penalty For Non-
Performance.  An agreement to provide a 
quantity of a specific product, in a specified 
period, when specified conditions are 
realized, and a dispatch signal or notice is 
issued or to purchase or use a quantity of a 
specific product in a specified period. 
Forward commitments may be physical with 
penalties for a failure to perform or financial 
when the obligation may be settled financially 
or covered by an offsetting transaction in a 
market that clears at a future point in time. 
 Resource Qualifications. To make a forward 
commitment to physically perform, a resource 
may have to meet and maintain specified 
physical, deliverability, measurement, testing, 
or other qualifications. Forward commitments 
also may require additional credit 
qualifications. 
 Response or Ramp Rate (Rate of Change in 
Output or Usage): Reserves (including 
Frequency Response, Regulation, and 
Operating Reserves) are dynamic in that the 
resources are required to change their output 
or usage at a specific rate commonly specified 
the movement of output or demand per 
second over a specified period. The required 
change in output or demand may be specified 
as a percentage of the called upon Reserve 
quantity. 
4. Distributed Locational Marginal Prices 
(DLMP) 
 
The value of electricity varies by time interval 
and location within any utility distribution system. 
With continuing advancements in information, 
communications, and control technology, it is 
feasible to extend time- and location-specific 
markets to reflect these differences. Establishing 
distribution level markets for DER products at 
more granular pricing would accomplish this.  We 
argue that understanding of and ability to 
calculate DLMPs is the critical step in the 
economic integration of DER into the power 
system and also provides the signals necessary for 
efficient physical operation of the system in much 
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the same manner as LMPs provide those signals at 
the wholesale level.    
 
Implementation of more granular pricing for 
core electric products at the distribution level 
provides the economic logic of the proposed 
Platform Market. The paper acknowledges that 
DLMP is only one of various possible approaches 
to calculation of the value of DER.  However, an 
analysis of the DLMP approach is fundamental to 
understanding the gains in economic efficiency 
from moving the pricing point for electric product 
production and consumption deeper into the 
distribution system.  
The mathematical structure for the calculation 
of DLMP is analogous to, and needs to be 
coordinated with the calculation of LMPs.  DLMP 
measures the locational value of real energy and 
reactive power at specific nodes within the 
distribution system, and therefore can measure the 
value of core electric products from DER. [5,6]  
The calculation of DLMP is distinct from and 
more complex than that for LMP but arrives at the 
same conceptual point from an economic 
perspective – it defines the precise marginal value 
of electric products and services at any point in 
time at any location within the distribution 
system.  
A key point to note with respect to the 
establishment of the distribution markets is the 
importance of the price of real energy in the 
wholesale or bulk market.  The price of real 
energy is the key driver of all the electric products 
against which DER products are competing. The 
same kW of capacity can only provide one core 
product during any given time period, e.g. real 
energy, reactive power, or reserves.  Any given 
asset can deliver a mix of core products but 
cannot do so beyond the maximum capacity of the 
unit.  Thus, when deciding which and what mix of 
core products to produce the resource owner has 
to decide which product or products will yield the 
greatest compensation.  The price of real energy is 
the most common reference point for those 
decisions. 
  
5. Platform-based market for DER 
The challenge being presented by the advent 
of DER is to design a new, distribution level 
market for energy and related electric products 
from DER that can animate and facilitate the 
financial transactions for these DER products.  
We propose a market paradigm that builds upon 
the rapidly expanding development of and 
academic understanding of economic platform 
markets. [1]    
As defined by Parker and Van Alstyne and 
others: 
A platform is business ecosystem that matches 
producers with consumers, who transact directly 
with each other using resources provided by the 
ecosystem itself. The platform ecosystem provides 
outside parties with easy access to useful products 
or services through an infrastructure and a set of 
rules designed to facilitate interactions among 
users. A platform’s overarching purpose is to 
consummate matches among users and to 
facilitate the exchange of goods and services, 
thereby enabling value creation for all 
participants.[7,8,9] 
A platform functions because of significant 
buyers and sellers that use it for transactions of 
goods and services. These participants on the 
platform provide the economic incentive for the 
development of third party products – network 
externalities – that can exist only because of the 
existence of the platform itself.  Platforms like 
Amazon, Uber, and AirBnB spawn these 
additional applications in products and services 
that range from technology to forecasting to name 
but two. 
 
The critical question for extending markets 
into the distribution sector through the 
establishment of platforms is how to create a 
highly liquid core product market that can provide 
a “level playing field” for DER, improve system 
efficiency and reliability, and provide benefits to 
customers.  This platform paradigm considers 
opportunities to:   
 Promote fair and open competition and reduce 
barriers to the development and use of DER;  
 Identify, quantify, and reflect in market 
design the temporal and spatial value of DER 
within the larger utility system; and  
 Capture the economic benefits of digital 
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platforms to support market operations, for 
example as a mechanism for price discovery 
and a means of integrating electric products 
with digitally based services.  
The design of this new market has drawn 
upon the well documented and extensive 
experience with electric market design at the 
wholesale level.  The key lesson from that 
experience is the importance of “getting the prices 
right.”  Prices in this new market need to reflect 
the value of core electric products from DER as a 
function of the time at which DER produces those 
products and the location at which DER produces 
them. Getting the prices right – more granular – 
for transactions within the distribution system 
requires that price formation take place deeper in 
the system. This more granular pricing will 
identify where, when and how DER can provide 
significant value through reduction in system 
operating cost or where the ability of DER to 
respond to these granular price signals can reduce 
the need for additional capital investment.   
Under the proposed market structure 
distribution utilities would continue to provide 
two services: delivery service and, where required 
by the market structure, default supply service. 
However, distribution utilities would specifically 
be responsible for integrating DER into their 
provision of delivery service in their respective 
service territories and assuming that the market 
structure included a shift to DLMP, they would 
have a financial incentive to do so. One 
component of that financial incentive would be 
net revenue that distribution utilities would 
receive due to the difference between charging for 
losses at the marginal cost of power and their 
actual cost of supplying those losses. Additional 
incentives would derive from increased 
transactions on the platform and from any 
creative, new long term regulatory recovery 
mechanisms that might be introduced.  
A Platform Market for DER would combine 
the benefits of a digital platform with the 
economic efficiency of more granular pricing that 
reflects their location- and time-specific value.   
Establishing a Platform Market would create 
additional value for DER owners and consumers 
by:  
 Expanding market access for DER. 
Demand Response (DR) programs typically 
provide the only available paths for active DER 
participation in the existing wholesale power 
markets, and there are significant gaps in DER 
participation in those markets. A Platform Market 
would expand DER access to markets for electric 
products and services by creating a new market 
and by reducing the transaction costs of accessing 
existing wholesale markets. The Platform Market 
would enable DER to provide real energy, 
reactive power, and reserves to Distribution 
Utilities, default suppliers, energy service 
companies (“ESCOs”), aggregators who would 
bundle and market DER resources, and even 
directly to other consumers. Additionally, 
distribution utilities initially can use the Platform 
to obtain option contracts or firm commitments 
from DER, and ultimately to rely on increasingly 
more granular distribution level pricing to 
promote the development of DER, in quantities 
and locations where DER can avoid investment in 
new substations and other major distribution 
investments. 
 Supporting new combinations of 
products and services.  By creating a market 
with a significant number of buyers and sellers 
with varying needs, and by enabling those buyers 
and sellers to find and execute transactions 
electronically, the Platform will support 
transactions for new, innovative combinations of 
products and services from DER and third parties 
at low transaction cost.  In addition, The Platform, 
by supporting the provision of price forecasts, 
data analytics, and other smart technology 
services would enable price responsive flexible 
demand, more efficient electric vehicle charging, 
and bring to market other distributed resources to 
consume or supply power when it is economical 
to do so consistent given customer preferences. 
(Price responsive demand is a method by which 
customers, such as space conditioning in 
commercial buildings and charging of electric 
vehicles, can reduce their energy costs by 
scheduling the flexible portion of their load 
according to the forecast price of electricity in 
each hour.) 
A number of studies have identified the 
technical potential for responsive demand to 
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reduce system peak to be as much as 25%.[10]  
More granular pricing could ensure that these 
changes in demand and distributed supply occur 
where they can provide the greatest value to the 
system as a whole. 
 Improving distribution system 
efficiency. Distribution Utilities traditionally 
manage voltage through investments in capacitor 
banks, line voltage regulators and load tap 
changers located on the primary, higher voltage 
elements of the distribution system. The 
implementation of new technologies like smart 
inverters on rooftop solar, distributed storage and 
electric vehicle systems or autonomous fast-acting 
distributed Var control (a current technology that 
enables up to 5% or greater energy and demand 
savings) may well provide a local source of Volt 
VAR control at a lower cost and at higher 
efficiency than traditional utility investments. [11]  
Our proposed structure is comprised of a 
forward (ex ante market for electric products and 
a separate (ex post) clearing market, both markets 
operating by and on the Platform. The forward 
market provides the structure through which the 
platform provider can bilaterally match location 
and time-based bids and continuous price 
formation can occur.  Bids and offers are visible 
on the Platform to all market participants but the 
Platform does not identify the entities making the 
bids or offers.  This market is continuous in that 
market participants can transact trades days 
ahead, at the time of the wholesale Day Ahead 
market or at any time up to the point of market 
closure (production and consumption).  The 
platform is the mechanism for bilateral 
distribution system level transactions in the 
forward market in much the same manner as other 
bilateral trading markets such as ICE and 
NYMEX operate for energy and other 
commodities where it provides transparency for 
bids and offers by product and location.   
We have proposed a separate clearing market 
to resolve the imbalances between scheduled 
supply and actual consumption that will occur 
under this market structure. Imbalances will occur 
because demand forecasting is not and cannot be 
perfect, and because electricity is produced and 
consumed simultaneously.  As a result, ex post, 
the platform financially clears all positions from 
the forward market. (In the wholesale market, the 
ISO accomplishes this through calculation of real 
time Locational Marginal Prices (LMP). In the 
platform market distribution utilities will provide 
to the platform the information it needs to 
calculate imbalances, i.e., metered quantities of 
real energy and reactive power actually consumed 
and the measured flows on the system. The 
Platform will run a mathematical load flow 
calculation, with, in the organized markets, the 
substation LMP as the reference price, to 
determine a clearing price at each of the traded 
distribution nodes.  This is conceptually 
comparable to the real-time LMPs the ISOs 
currently calculate.  While the complexity of the 
calculations will increase with greater levels of 
granularity and the need to recognize the value of 
reactive as well as real power, the logic of the 
calculation is independent of the level of 
granularity of the nodal system and therefore is 
easily extended as the market expands.  
The establishment and operation of a platform 
requires a breadth and depth of participants along 
with the platform sponsor and a platform 
provider.  The size of the potential participant 
pool on both the buy and sell side is critical to the 
acceptance and the success of the platform.   
To further describe the operation for DER 
products, appendix A provides an example of the 
transactional steps in “A day in the life of the 
Platform” under a DLMP Market.  
6. The Benefits of DLMP over Business as 
Usual and only LMP: Example 
The authors have developed a quantitative 
assessment of the value of moving to more 
granular locational prices under a platform market 
by using the DistCostMin (DCM) model, an 
optimization modeling system developed by 
Boston University for analysis of the economic 
value of provision of and response to increasingly 
granular pricing of core electricity prices in the 
distribution system.[4]  The DCM model was 
used to compare the marginal cost of real and 
reactive power supply to a simulated 800 bus 
radial feeder with both commercial and residential 
demand incorporating supply (solar) and storage 
(electric vehicle) loads along with space 
conditioning located in the Capital Region of New 
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York State.   
DCM considers full AC load flow constraints. 
As per [12], a radial network with voltage 
magnitude constraints and non-convex full AC 
load flow constraints, can be seen to have a 
unique optimal solution. This means that the dual 
solution, i.e. the nodal prices, will be unique [6] 
and applies KKT conditions to find the building 
blocks that comprise the nodal prices. In 
particular, DCM uses the reduced branch flow 
model developed by [13] and furthered by [14]. In 
most radial distribution networks, and in the one 
examined here, we can verify through simulations 
that the relaxation is tight. The authors would like 
to point out the possible multiplicity of solutions 
in the case of meshed networks with AC load 
flow considerations as an interesting future 
research direction.  
The modeling results illustrate the criticality 
of location within the distribution feeder and thus 
of the relative value (positive and negative) of 
energy within the system. DCM valued real 
energy plus reactive power at each node, i.e., at 
commercial customer meters and at residential 
pole transformers, for a peak summer day and a 
peak winter day for each market structure under 
low and high levels of DER penetration. Figure 1 
provides a graphic summary of the results of the 
DLMP (dollar value) for real energy and reactive 
power indicating the maximum and minimum 
values that occurred at any point within the 
system for each hour and the LMP nodal value 
(the nearest point to the bulk power market). As 
can be seen at 2pm on the test day the value of 
real power ranges from a low of $0.033 to a high 
of $0.112 per kWh while reactive power for the 
same time period ranges from a low of zero to a 
high $0.038 per kVarh.   
 
 
Figure 1: DLMPs Summer Peak Day 
 
7. Conclusion 
The paper has introduced three critical concepts in 
development of a competitive market at the retail 
level that allows the market for DER to function 
coordinated with the wholesale market and 
respect the underlying physics of the power 
system.  The first concept is that there are three 
core products (real power, reactive power and 
reserves); all other products in the market are 
combinations of these three in space and time.  
The second concept is that it is both necessary and 
possible to calculate Distributed Locational 
Marginal Costs (DLMP) and that without this 
ability it is not possible to value any DER.  The 
third concept is that for there to be a market for 
DER that can be interactive with the wholesale 
market there should be an economic platform on 
which these product can be traded.  These three 
concepts are developed within the paper and 
numeric examples are provided of the economic 
value of “getting the prices right” at the 
distribution level. 
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9. Appendix: A Day in the Life of a 
Platform: DLMP 
Assumptions underlying this chronology 
 For any given electrical region (state, 
Province, etc.) there is only one financial 
Platform, and it interacts and exchanges 
critical information and data with each 
Distribution System Operator (DSO) or 
functional equivalent that oversee the physical 
distribution system (see next bullet). 
 DSOs will monitor, operate and maintain the 
physical distribution system (e.g., wires, 
transformers, switches, capacitor banks.)  
This discussion assumes each DSO has a 
system-monitoring and distribution level 
state-estimation process, enabling it to 
provide the Platform, in near-real-time, 
descriptions of what the distribution system’s 
actual topology has been on an interval-by-
interval basis, and what the physical flow on 
the distribution system has been on an 
interval-by-interval basis. 
 The Distribution System Operator, is assumed 
to provide the Platform: 
o specifications for any local distribution 
system reactive power management 
capabilities that it wishes to procure from 
DERs;  
o specifications for any location-specific 
reserves that it wishes to procure from DERs 
to address local constraints within its 
distribution system; and 
o information on its dispatch of DERs for 
reactive power management, on its location-
specific reserves for settlements, and on the 
performance of DERs it dispatched. 
 Energy Service Companies (ESCOs) are 
market participants that provide energy or 
offerings that include energy and other 
products and services to end-use consumers.  
They are financially responsible parties for 
the acquisition and settlement of energy and 
other products and services transacted over 
the Platform. 
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o ESCOs may aggregate the requirements and 
resources of small consumers and prosumers 
(generation and load response) into packages 
they can then trade in standard units on the 
Platform. 
o ESCOs will combine energy with other 
potentially high-value products and services 
available on the Platform to provide offers 
tailored to the preferences and requirements 
of specific customers, including both large 
and small consumers and prosumers. 
 Distribution Utilities, should they also be 
default suppliers, function similar to the 
ESCO as a regulatory requirement.  They 
would be subject to regulatory oversight and 
potentially performance-based incentives. 
 DSOs purchase distribution-reactive power 
management capabilities and location -
specific reserves from DERs. 
 Distribution Utilities, as distribution system 
operators, will monitor activity and forward 
market liquidity in the Platform’s DLMP 
markets, paying particular attention to areas in 
their distribution systems that rely on DER for 
service reliability, and, if needed, will 
contract for and hold in reserve the output of 
DER assets that may be required to address 
future local constraints. 
 Market participants are ESCOs, Distribution 
Utilities, aggregators, third-party product and 
service providers, financial participants, end -
use customers participating on their own 
account, and DERs and prosumers. 
 Aggregators (when and where economically 
relevant) are market participants that purchase 
and bundle the capabilities of smaller 
customers for resale to ESCOs, default 
suppliers, and NYISO. 
Initial Conditions on the Platform 
 Because the market on the Platform will be 
continuous, some market participants  will 
have standing positions (bids to buy, offers to 
sell) for standard products for extended time 
blocks, i.e., similar to the standard 
transactions traded in today’s wholesale 
market that focus on peak and off-peak hourly 
blocks. Bids to buy and offers to sell include a 
pricing provision. 
 The Platform will provide a continuous 
matching of bids and offers (the market-
making function) that, as part of the Platform 
functionality, will include standard contract 
terms and conditions (market operation rules) 
for transactions, as well as the mechanisms 
for market settlement.  
 The Platform will have, at all times, multiple 
forecasts from the DSO and third parties of 
locational prices. These forecasts will be 
dynamic, changing as conditions change and 
as the clock moves forward.  
Prior to the Day Ahead wholesale (ISO) energy 
market 
 Retail suppliers (ESCOs, Distribution Utilities 
and others) will forecast their hourly needs for 
the next day and, if they elect to do so, bid 
into, the ISO market for supplies, as is the 
case today.   
 Distribution Utilities providing default supply 
service to customers will purchase the supply 
for those customers from the ISO’s Day 
Ahead Market.  However, prior to making 
those purchases, Distribution Utilities would 
provide customers the option to accept or 
modify their respective supply requirements 
for the delivery day.  
After the close of the Day Ahead bulk power 
(ISO) energy market and before the close of each 
real time (hourly1) market on the Platform 
 All market participants now have the 
information reported by the Platform as to the 
(hourly) expected value of nodal LMP, and 
the value for Real Energy and reserves (as 
well as any other day-ahead ancillary 
services) that have cleared the day-ahead 
market. 
 Additional bids and offers are entered onto 
the Platform by  market participants wanting 
to create a position in the Platform’s real-time 
                                                 
1 “Hourly” is used only to indicate an agreed time step. 
Sub-hourly time steps are equally likely. 
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market (for instance DERs and prosumers) or 
improve their market position (such as 
ESCOs or Distribution Utilities). 
 The Platform will continuously match 
bilateral bids and offers providing for 
continuous price discovery.   
 The Platform will collect a transaction fee 
from the sellers (least-elastic entity) as a 
percentage of each buy/sell transaction logged 
on the Platform. 
At the time of closure of the Platform electric 
product markets 
 The Platform will continue to match bids and 
offers until a time certain before the close of 
the time period in which the electric product 
will be finally “delivered.” “Delivery” in this 
context is purely financial i.e., the market 
participant that has contracted to supply or 
buy energy is financially obligated to supply 
or consume against the terms of the standard 
contract.  The Platform will settle any 
imbalance between market positions for real 
energy at market close and actual delivery or 
consumption at interval marginal prices based 
on actual distribution system topology and 
power flows, as discussed below.  
 The Platform will collect a transaction fee as 
a percentage of each buy/sell transaction 
logged on the Platform. 
After the closure of the Platform electric product 
market 
 The Platform will query and receive from the 
DSO a record of energy produced and 
consumed by location within the distribution 
system and system information needed to 
calculate imbalance prices. 
 Based on the contracted values of the closed 
market and DSO record of energy produced 
and consumed (by specific location), the 
market clearing function of the Platform will 
calculate ex post clearing prices for energy 
and reactive power by location.   
o The clearing calculation will take place as a 
function of ex post actual real and reactive 
energy consumed and delivered, forward real 
and reactive power obligations requirements, 
operating resources, power flows, marginal 
losses, and any constraints within the 
distribution system (network) during each 
interval (integrated over the Platform trading 
period) as well as any marginal deterioration 
in the lifetime of capital assets such as 
transformers.  
 If during the interval there are no distribution 
system constraints affecting the portion of the 
monitored distribution network that includes 
the relevant DLMP pricing point, the interval 
DLMP energy clearing price will be 
calculated algorithmically, based on the 
applicable ex post nodal (wholesale) DLMP 
based on the distribution network power 
flows for each interval.  
 In this case, the DLMP reactive power 
clearing price for resources enrolled and 
operated within the DSO’s Volt VAR 
Control (VVC) program will be equal to 
the resources net DLMP lost opportunity 
cost from being limited in its ability to 
provide Real Energy. The DSO may pay 
resources participating in VVC programs 
an option price that allows the utility to 
call upon the resource to provide VAR 
support and voltage control. 
 The Platform will provide all financial 
clearing information to market 
participants. The Platform is the 
bookkeeping entity of the market. 
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